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INTRODUCTION
The Illinois Wrongful Death Act' ("the Act") creates an action
for the death of any person caused by the default, neglect, or
wrongful act of another. The action may be brought by the per-
sonal representative of the deceased, 2 and the damages received
are for the exclusive benefit of the spouse or next of kin.3 In pro-
viding for damages, the Act states: "[T]he jury may give such
damages as they deem a fair and just compensation with refer-
ence to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death."4
The legislature did not define the term "pecuniary injuries" in
the statute, instead leaving this task to the judiciary. Illinois
courts have focused primarily on the decedent's economic contri-
bution: the monetary value of the services and financial support
the decedent would have provided to the spouse and next of
kin.5 Wrongful death damages are meant to be compensatory in
nature, however, and this narrow focus does not recognize that
1. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, 1, 2 (1981). The statute was enacted in 1853 and created a
new cause of action, previously unknown at common law. City of Chicago v. Major, 18
Ill. 349 (1857).
2. The first Illinois Supreme Court decision to interpret the Wrongful Death Act was
City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349 (1857). There the court construed the statutory lan-
guage "personal representative" as including the executor or administrator of the dece-
dent's estate. The Act was amended in 1977 to allow an action to be brought by a special
administrator appointed by the court. 1977 Ill. Laws 2227 (codified at ILL REV. STAT. ch.
70, 2.1 (1981)).
3. As originally enacted, the Act provided that the damages awarded were to be dis-
tributed to the next of kin according to the laws of intestacy. The Act was amended to
provided distribution on the basis of the next of kin's dependancy upon the deceased.
1955 Ill. Laws 7006 (codified at ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, 2 (1981)). This change did not alter
the definition of pecuniary injuries, only the method of distribution. See Barrow v. Lence,
17 Ill. App. 2d 277, 451 N.E.2d 120 (1958). See also infra text accompanying notes 57-63.
The phrase "next of kin" has been interpreted to preclude actions brought by employers
or friends not related by blood. Eg., Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 III. 2d 31,
330 N.E.2d 509 (1975).
4. Illinois Wrongful Death Act, ILL REv. STAT. ch. 70, 2 (1981) (emphasis added).
5. E.g., Allendorf v. Elgin, I. & E. R.R., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288 (1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 833, reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 937 (1957). See also ILLINOIS PArERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) Nos. 31.01-31.09 (2d ed. 1971).
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beneficiaries often sustain more than mere economic losses.6
In recognition of the potentially harsh results of this narrow
interpretation, Illinois courts have expanded the term "pecuniary
injuries" on a case by case basis to include certain intangible
elements of family relationships. Specifically, courts have held
that the loss of a spouse's consortium,7 the loss of a parent's
instruction and training,8 and the the loss of a parent's felicity
and care9 are pecuniary injuries. The question of whether pecuni-
ary injuries include the loss of the intangible elements of other
family relationships remains unanswered. 10 Recently, however,
the Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in the case of
Bullard v. Barnes11 to determine whether a parent's loss of a
child's society12 should be recoverable as a pecuniary injury.1 3
This note first examines the history of the Illinois Wrongful
Death Act and the interpretation of pecuniary injury under the
Act as it has been formulated by the courts. The expansion of the
term "pecuniary injury" is then examined, followed by an analy-
sis of the appellate court decision in Bullard. This note will then
6. Parents' recoveries are thus limited by this narrow interpretation. See infra text
accompanying notes 37-40. See also Comment, Damages for the Wrongful Death of a
Child, 22 U. CHI. L REV. 538, 543 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Wrongful Death of a Child];
Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REV. 402, 412 (1966).
An action for the death of an elderly person also presents the problem of proving an
economic loss. See generally S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (2d ed. 1975) (a
definitive two volume treatise on wrongful death actions); Note, A Modern View of
Wrongful Death Recoveries: Herein of the Infant and the Aged, 54 Nw. U.L REV. 254
(1954).
7. In Elliott v. Willis, 92 Ill. 2d 520, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982), the Illinois Supreme Court
held a spouse's loss of consortium to be a pecuniary injury. Consortium was defined to
include society, guidance, companionship, felicity, and sexual relations, and was held to
be unique to the marriage partner. Id. at 535, 442 N.E.2d at 166. See infra text accompan-
ying notes 64-81.
8. E.g., Goddard v. Enzler, 222 Ill. 462, 78 N.E. 805 (1906).
9. E.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Weldon, 52 Ill. 290 (1869).
10. The Illinois Supreme Court has not considered whether collateral relatives, such
as siblings, may recover for the loss of intangible elements. See infra note 123.
11. 112 1l1. App. 3d 384, 445 N.E.2d 485 (1983), appeal docketed, No. 58-203 (Ill. Sup.
Ct. May Term, 1983). Oral argument was heard by the court on November 30, 1983.
12. A definition of the term "society" has not been formulated by the Illinois courts.
The United States Supreme Court has defined society to include the broad range of mu-
tual benefits each family member receives from the others' continued existence, including
love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection. Sealand Servs. v.
Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 986 (1974). For the purposes of this
note, this definition will be used to represent the elements of a child's society.
13. Two Illinois Appellate Court decisions have held that the loss of a child's society
is not compensable as a pecuniary injury. See Bullard v. Barnes, 112 111. App. 3d 384, 445
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look to prior statutory interpretation and public policy to deter-
mine whether the loss of a child's society should be recognized as
a pecuniary injury under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act.
HISTORY OF WRONGFUL DEATH ACTS
At common law, civil suits for damages sustained as the result
of a wrongful death of a family member were barred. The impe-
tus for this rule was a brief nisi prius decision rendered in 1808
which held that the death of an individual could not be claimed
as an injury by family members in a civil court.14 Although
today the basis for barring common law wrongful death actions
is generally discredited, 15 this prohibition was previously accepted
and relied upon in the United States for some time. 16 The absurd
effect of this rule was that a defendant's liability could be estab-
lished when his negligence caused an injury, but not when it
N.E.2d 485 (1983); Trotter v. Moore, 113 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 447 N.E.2d 1340 (1980). See
infra text accompanying notes 84-97.
14. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). The English trial court
stated: "In a civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an
injury; and in this case the damages, as to the plaintiffs wife, must stop with the period
of her existence." Id. at 493, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1033. The felony merger doctrine has been
identified as a principle justification for the holding in Baker. According to this doctrine,
if an act such as a homicide is punishable as a felony, no civil action case arises because
the sovereign pre-empts the entire case. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Com-
mon Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605,609-10 (1960).
15. See Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043 (1965). Another
thoughtful criticism appears in Sweeny, Right of Surviving Spouse to Damages for Loss
of Consortium, 26 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 221 (1982-83), in which the author finds that Baker
fails as precedent because, "first, it was dictum; second, it was a nisi prius decision; third,
it was contrary to English precedent; fourth, it was decided in 1808, two centuries after
... most states ... had adopted the common law of England . .. ; [and,] fifth, it is not
supported by natural justice." Id. at 227. For a complete discussion of the case, see
Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REV. 431 (1916).
16. Holdsworth, supra note 15, states that the rule in Baker v. Bolton was upheld in
later cases "not by reasoning based upon a discussion of the question of its policy or
impolicy, not by any sufficient technical or historical reasons, but by the assertion that it
is a rule of the common law which must be followed." Id. at 431. One commentator,
however, suggests that the American courts did not immediately follow Baker v. Bolton.
Malone, supra note 15, at 1067. The first distinct pronouncement of the rule in the United
States appeared in Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475, 48 Am. Dec. 616
(1848), a Massachusetts case decided 40 years after Baker v. Bolton. The rule has been
recited in Illinois cases. See, e.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304
N.E.2d 88 (1973); Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958); Mattyasovsky v.
West Towns Bus Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496 (1974). But see Wilbon v. D.F.
Bast Co., 73 Ill. 2d 127, 383 N.E.2d 929 (1978) (criticizing the rule preventing common law
actions but stopping short of allowing such an action).
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caused a death. 17 In England, recognition of this intolerable
inequity led to the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act,18 which
has been the model for most subsequent state wrongful death
statutes.19
Lord Campbell's Act provided that an action could be brought
against a person who had caused another's death by wrongful
act, neglect, or default.20 In referring to damages, the statute
states: "[I]n every such action the jury may give such damages
as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such
death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit
such action shall be brought."21 This broad language was first
interpreted narrowly in Blake v. Midland Railway,22 an 1852
case which held that the statute was designed to compensate the
family of the deceased and not to provide solace for their wounded
feelings. 23 Although Blake only denied recovery for mental suf-
fering under Lord Campbell's Act, subsequent cases interpreted
the Blake decision to limit all damages to actual pecuniary inju-
17. Prosser relates an unfounded legend that "this was the original reason that pas-
sengers in Pullman car berths rode with their heads to the front. Also fire axes in the
railroad coaches were provided to enable the conductor to deal efficiently with those who
were merely injured." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 902 (4th ed. 1971).
18. The official title was "An Act Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by
Accidents." It was also known as the Fatal Injuries Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93. The
inequity of the common law rule denying recovery for a wrongful death became apparent
with the advent of industrialization. The development of the railroads and factories
resulted in an increased incidence of fatal accidents. Malone, supra note 15, at 1043.
19. See S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at 104; Comment, Wrongful Death and Loss of Con-
sortium in Connecticut, 14 CONN. L. REv. 631, 638 (1982). Lord Campbell's Act was also
the model for the Illinois Act. Lw ANN. STAT. ch. 70, 1 historical note 530 (Smith-Hurd
1975). See also Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928).
Lord Campbell's Act measures damages in terms of loss to the decedent's survivors. In
jurisdictions which do not follow this statute, the remedies provided can be separated into
three categories: statutes that measure damages by the loss sustained by the estate; stat-
utes that are actually survival statutes enlarged to include damages for death; and stat-
utes that measure damages according to the tortfeasor's culpability. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 comment b (1979). For a discussion of the application of these
statutes in actions for the wrongful death of a child, see Decof, Damages in Actions for
Wrongful Death of Children, 47 NOTRE DAME LAw. 197 (1971).
20. The text of the Act states "[tihat whensoever the death of a person shall be caused
by Wrongful Act, Neglect or Default and the Act, Neglect or Default is such as would (if
Death had not Ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages thereof." Fatal Injuries Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93.
21. Id.
22. 28 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852).
23. The court formulated the question before them as "whether the jury in giving
damages ... may add a solatiun to those parties (bringing the action) in respect of the
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ries suffered as a result of the death.24 As originally interpreted,
a pecuniary loss was one which could be specifically measured,
and usually represented the dollar value of the lost income and
services that were previously provided by the decedent. 25
Notwithstanding the criticism that this narrow interpretation
of Lord Campbell's Act had received, 26 the pecuniary loss limita-
tion was adopted by most states, either by an express statutory
provision 27 or by judicial construction of the wrongful death stat-
ute. 28 This ready adoption of the pecuniary loss limitation
resulted from the fear that, absent some limitation, the awards
would be based on sentiment or vengeance.29
Although most states initially adopted the potentially restric-
tive pecuniary loss limitation, there has since been a trend
toward expanding the scope of compensable injuries. In several
states, the legislatures have amended their wrongful death acts
to provide specifically for the compensation of traditionally non-
economic injuries such as the loss of society and the loss of con-
sortium.30 Several statutes go so far as to allow damages for the
mental suffering occassioned by such death." Blake, id. at 108, 118 Eng. Rep. at 40-41.
The court concluded that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that they should
not take into consideration the mental sufferings of the plaintiff for the loss of her hus-
band. Id. at 111-12, 118 Eng. Rep. at 42.
24. For a discussion of the early English decisions, see H. TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONG-
FUL AcT § 154 (2d ed. 1913).
25. See, e.g., Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913). The Court was con-
struing the Employer's Liability Act of 1908, which did not expressly state that recovery
was limited to pecuniary injuries, but was previously interpreted to so limit recovery. The
Court in Vreeland held that to recover, the loss must be measurable by some standard,
and that the Act did not allow recovery for an inestimable loss such as the loss of a
spouse's companionship.
26. "[Alt best this interpretation was a dubious one, since Lord Campbell's Act sets
forth no limitation on the recovery other than that the damages should be proportionate
to the injury suffered by the beneficiary. At worst, what the English Court did was an
outright amendment of the statute." J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY: PERSONAL INJURY
AND DEATH ACTIONS 518 (1972).
27. Today the recovery of damages is limited to pecuniary injuries in the Federal
Death on High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1696 (1976), and in the following eight state stat-
utes: GA. CODE § 105-1308 (1983 Supp.); Illinois Wrongful Death Act, ILL REV. STAT. ch.
70, 2 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804(b) (1981); MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (1983
Supp.); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A(31-5) (1983 Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-3 (1983 Supp.);
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST § 5-4.3 (McKinney 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02
(Page 1982 Supp.).
28. For a discussion of the states which have construed their statutes as limiting
awards to pecuniary injuries, see S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at 109 n.7.
29. E.g., J. STEIN, supra note 26, at 482.
30. Michigan amended its Wrongful Death Act in 1972 to allow recovery for the loss
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grief and emotional harm that results from the loss of a loved
one.
31
Those statutes which do not specifically limit recovery to
pecuniary injury have been interpreted to also include recovery
for these noneconomic losses.3 2 This general broadening of allow-
able recovery has resulted in some courts interpreting stat-
utes that expressly limit recovery to pecuniary losses as broad
enough to include loss of society and loss of consortium. 33
This broadening is reflected in the seminal Michigan Supreme
Court decision of Wycko v. Gnodtke.3 4 The Gnodtke court rejected
of society and companionship of the deceased. MICH. COMP. LAws § 27A.2922 (1981).
Other states that have amended their wrongful death acts include: Florida, FLA. STAT.
§ 768.21 (1982); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-3 (Supp. 1982); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1904 (1976); Maryland, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904(d) (1980); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174(4)c (Supp. 1981); and Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 1942(b) (Supp. 1983).
On March 4, 1981, Illinois House Bill 0455 was introduced in the 82d General Assem-
bly. The bill sought to amend the Illinois Wrongful Death Act to allow for the recovery of
loss of companionship and society in addition to pecuniary injuries. I LEGISLATIVE SYN-
OPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 1982 SESSION OF THE 82D GENERAL ASSEMBLY 697 (Legislative
Reference Bureau Feb. 11, 1983).
31. Eight states allow recovery for mental anguish in a wrongful death action:
Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27.090 (1979); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1982); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 64-1904 (1976); Maryland, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904(d)
(1980); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.084 (1979); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1053
(1981); Virginia, VA. CODE § 8.01-52 (Supp. 1983); and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 55-7-
6 (Supp. 1983).
32. For example, the California statute provides for "such damages as may be just."
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West 1984 Supp.). This was interpreted to permit recovery for
the loss of society, comfort, and companionship in a parent's action for the death of their
child. Bond v. United RR. of San Francisco, 159 Cal. 270, 113 P. 366 (1911). In Montana,
the statute states that "such damages may be given as, under all the circumstances of the
case, may be just." MONT. CODE ANN. § 93-2810 (1977) The Montana Supreme Court inter-
preted this language to allow recovery for the pecuniary value of decedent's companion-
ship, comfort, and society. Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel., 58 Mont. 521, 100 P. 971
(1909). The Pennsylvania statute allows compensation for "any damages for a death," 12
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1601 (Purdom 1970), which has been interpreted to allow for com-
panionship, comfort, society, guidance, solace, and protection. Spangler v. Helms N.Y.
Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959).
33. See, e.g., Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961). The pecuniary
value of a child's advice and guidance as well as his companionship was held compen-
sable in Green v. Bittner, 95 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980). But see Liff v. Schlidkrout, 49
N.Y.2d 622, 404 N.E.2d 1288 (1980) (deferring to the legislature on the question of whether
the loss of consortium is an element of pecuniary injury). The result of the different state
interpretations of their wrongful death acts is that a life can be worth considerably more
in some jurisdictions than in others. See Note, supra note 6, at 255-56 n.8.
34. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960). At the time Wycko was decided, the Michi-
gan Wrongful Death Act was similar to the Illinois Act. It expressly limited the recovery
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a strict value measure of pecuniary loss when it allowed a parent
to recover for the loss of a child's companionship in a wrongful
death action.35 The historical reasons that supported the strict
measure of loss were found by the court to be no longer
sufficient. 36
The United States Supreme Court recognized the legislative
and judicial trend toward expanding the scope of recovery in
Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet,37 in which the Court permitted
recovery by a spouse for the loss of her husband's society under
a maritime wrongful death action. In allowing damages for the
loss of society,38 the Court noted that it was aligning the mari-
time wrongful death remedy with a majority of state wrongful
death acts.39
of damages to pecuniary injuries suffered as a result of the wrongful death. Prior to this
decision, the Michigan courts had used a balance sheet approach to compute the amount
of damages that a parent sustained. The courts subtracted the speculative costs of rear-
ing the child from the hypothetical earnings of the child prior to his majority. The
remaining sum, if any, was deemed to be the pecuniary loss. See supra notes 34-36.
35. The court adopted, in part, the lost investment theory of recovery. This theory
suggests that the cost of birth, food, clothing, medicine, instruction, nurture, and shelter
may be compensated as the amount of money the parent has invested in raising the
child. See Note, supra note 6, at 262. The court expanded upon this theory by including
the value of the child's society as part of the compensable damages. The lost investment
theory has not been readily accepted, however, it was discussed with approval in Ander-
son v. Lale, 216 N.E.2d 152 (S.D. 1974). But see Wallace v. Woods, 149 Ind. App. 157, 271
N.E.2d 487 (1971); Gravley v. Sea Gull Marines, Inc., 269 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978);
Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973).
36. The court carefully examined the economic contributions that children in the past
made to their families. The court rejected the child-labor measure of pecuniary loss and
stated:
There still exists in the law this remote and repulsive backwash of time and
civilization, untouched by the onward march of society, where precedents we
alone honor tell us that the value of the life of a child must be measured by the
standards of the day when he peddled the skill of his hands and the strength of
his back at the factory gates.
361 Mich. at 335, 105 N.W.2d at 121.
37. 414 U.S. 573(1974).
38. Sea-Land illustrates that courts have not adopted a standard definition of the
term "society." Although Sea-Land involved a spouse's action, the Supreme Court did not
use the term "consortium." Instead, the court used the term "society" and did not distin-
guish between a spouse's action and a parent's or child's action. The Court was careful,
however, to distinguish between the loss of society and recovery for mental anguish.
Mental anguish was held to represent an emotional response to a wrongful death that is
not compensable under most wrongful death statutes. Id. at 585-86 n.17.
39. Sea-Land is a case of great significance. S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at 319. Although
it was a maritime action, the Court indicated that it was summarizing the rules of law
regarding damages compensable under state wrongful death statutes. The Court allowed
the plaintiff widow to recover damages for the loss of support, services, and society.
602 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 15
RECOVERY UNDER THE ILLINOIS
WRONGFUL DEATH ACT
The Illinois Wrongful Death Act was enacted in 185340 to
create a statutory remedy for pecuniary injuries sustained as a
result of a death caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default. 41
The term "pecuniary injury" is not defined in the Illinois statute.42
The Illinois courts have interpreted the phrase to include tangi-
ble elements such as the financial worth of the decedent, as well
as the monetary value of the support and services provided to
the spouse and next of kin.43 Courts have not limited recovery to
40. Wrongful Death Act of Feb. 12, 1853, 1853 Ill. Laws 97 (codified at ILL REV. STAT.
ch. 70, 1-2 (1981)).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 1-2 (1981). Damages can be no more than the pecuniary
injury. See, e.g., Lake Shore & Mich. So. R.R. v. Ouska, 151 M. 232,37 N.E. 397 (1895).
There is no express language in the Act which states that it is to be the exclusive
remedy for the wrongful death of an individual. The Illinois courts, however, have inter-
preted the Act to preclude common law death actions, stating that since there was no
action at common law, the right to bring a wrongful death action is purely statutory. Li
Petri v. Turner Constr. Co., 36 Ill. 2d 597, 224 N.E.2d 841 (1964); Dougherty v. American
McKenna Process Co., 225 Ill. 369, 99 N.E. 619 (1912). For a discussion of the limitations
of the Act and the suggestion that Illinois courts recognize common law death actions,
see McElvain, The Illinois Wrongful Death Act and the Common Law, 1979 S. ILL U.LJ.
251.
42. A statutory definition would help to resolve any dispute over the scope of the term
"pecuniary injury." In 21 states, wrongful death statutes expressly allow damages for
lost society and companionship. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-909 (1979); FLA. STAT. § 768.21
(1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1976); IOWA CODE § 633-336 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1904 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.135 (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804
(Supp. 1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904(d) (1980); MASS. ANN. LAws ch.
229, § 1 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1982); MicH. COMP. LAws § 27A.2922 (1981); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537-090 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28.174 (Supp. 1982);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 1055 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 30-020 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 1492(b) (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 8.01-52 (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE § 424-010
(1983); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (Supp. 1982); WIs. STAT. § 895.05 (Supp. 1983); WYO. STAT.
§ 1-38-102 (Supp. 1982).
43. The term "pecuniary injury" is examined in depth in a 1928 Illinois Supreme
Court decision, Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 111. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928), in which the court
defined pecuniary loss, as follows:
[W]hat the life of the deceased was in a pecuniary sense worth to them and such
loss is to be determined from proof of... the amount of his usual earnings, as
proof of what he might in all probability earn for the future support of his wife
and children. The amount to be recovered is the pecuniry value of such addition
to his estate as the deceased in reasonable probability would have made and
left if his death had not been wrongfully caused.
Id. at 575, 162 N.E. at 173. For example, evidence of the deceased father's ability to make
home improvements and repairs has been held sufficient to prove a pecuniary loss.
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these tangible elements, however. Rather, in Illinois, the scope of
the phrase has been expanded through judicial interpretation.
The courts have done this in two ways: first, by recognizing a
presumption of pecuniary loss in the event of a wrongful death;
and, second, by expanding the term to include certain intangible
elements of loss.
Presumption of Pecuniary Loss
Illinois is one of a number of states utilizing a presumption of
pecuniary loss when the decedent leaves a direct lineal heir or
spouse.44 The Illinois Supreme Court first articulated this pre-
sumption in City of Chicago v. Scholten.45 The Scholten court
held that the plaintiff father was not required to prove actual
services of a pecuniary value provided by his deceased son, but
that the court would presume a pecuniary loss for which
compensation could be given.46 Such a presumption can be
supported by establishing personal attributes of the deceased to
be considered in assessing the amount of pecuniary loss sus-
tained.47 Subsequent to Scholten, Illinois courts have not limited
the use of the presumption to a parent's action in which it is
difficult to prove economic contribution by the child.48 Its use
has been expanded to apply in cases in which the decedent was
an adult and the next of kin were also adults.49 The presumption
Allendorf v. Elgin J. & E. R.R., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
853, reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 937 (1967).
44. Other states which use a presumption of pecuniary loss include Arkansas, Indi-
ana, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Wisconsin. S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at 309. See also Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 514 (1950).
For a discussion of the nature and effect of presumptions in wrongful death actions, see
S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at 310.
45. 75 111. 468 (1874).
46. The plaintiff's son was 12 years old at the time of his death. The court realized the
difficulty inherent in proving pecuniary loss, because a child has not developed his habits
of industry. In addition his potential financial worth, which is an element of pecuniary
loss, cannot easily be determined. See infra notes 98-101. In formulating the presumption,
the court relied on the earlier cases which had allowed the jury to estimate the pecuniary
damages from the facts proven in connection with their own knowledge and experience.
E.g., City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349 (1857).
47. Scholten, 75 Ill. at 472. The court found that the damages to be awarded to the
father could be increased by "evidence of the child's mental and physical capacity to be
of service to his father in his business, his habits of industry and sobriety, where the
deceased is old enough to have established a character." Id. at 472-73.
48. See Recent Decisions, Wrongful Death-A Presumption of Substantial Pecuniary
Loss Arises if the Next of Kin are Lineal, 1964 U. ILL LF. 683.
49. In Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis RR. v. Woolridge, 174 Ill. 330,336,51 N.E. 701,703
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is outlined in the pattern jury instructions, and is used routinely
in cases involving lineal heirs and spouses.50 It ensures that an
award above nominal damages will be granted.51
The presumption of loss, although strong, is not conclusive. In
a recent Illinois Supreme Court decision, Flynn v. Vancil,52 the
presumption was held to be rebuttable. In Flynn, the father
brought suit for the wrongful death of his two week old daughter.
During the trial, evidence of an incurable congenital defect that
impaired the health of the child was presented. The jury found
the defendant liable but awarded no damages. In upholding the
verdict, the Supreme Court found that the jury could reasonably
have concluded that the facts regarding the health of the infant
rebutted the presumption of pecuniary loss sustained by the
parents.
Since the presumption is rebuttable, there is the possibility
that no damages will be awarded when the defendant offers
(1898), the court found that the presumption of pecuniary loss extends to all lineal heirs.
Illinois courts have continued to use the presumption in wrongful death actions involving
lineal heirs. E.g., Ferraro v. Augustine, 45 Ill. App. 2d 295, 196 N.E.2d 16 (1964). But see
Barrow v. Lence, 17 Ill. App. 2d 527, 151 N.E.2d 120 (1958) (If there is an adult decedent
and an adult beneficiary, there must be an evidentiary basis for the claim of pecuniary
loss; the presumption has no importance except in the case of a child who has not yet
formed habits of industry.).
50. See Recent Decisions, supra note 48, at 685. The presumption has never been
extended to collateral heirs, who must show proof of monetary loss to recover more than
nominal damages. See Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 II. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928); Rhodes v. Chi-
cago & Alton R.R., 227 Ill. 328, 81 N.E. 371 (1907). The jury instruction reads, in pertinent
part, "[T]he law recognizes a presumption that the (lineal heir) has (have) sustained some
substantial pecuniary loss by reason of the death." ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(CmIL) No. 31.01 (2d ed. 1971).
51. See, e.g., Wallace v. City of Rock Island, 323 Ill. App. 639, 56 N.E.2d 536 (1944).
The parents of a 13 year old brought a wrongful death action after the child was killed.
The jury rendered an award of $500, which was reversed by the appellate court. The court
found that the award constituted only nominal damages and thus was not sufficient
compensation for the parents. See also Note, supra note 6, at 258.
52. 41 Ill. 2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237 (1968). Flynn was the first case to state that the
presumption is, in fact, rebuttable, although the presumption was first formulated in
1874. Before Flynn, there were no cases analyzing the effect of the presumption, but its
existence was recited as a matter of course by reviewing courts as they upheld verdicts.
See Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928) (lineal next of kin presumed to suffer
pecuniary loss from the fact of death); Dukeman v. Cleveland, St. Louis R.R., 237 Ill. 104,
86 N.E. 712 (1909) (the law presumes substantial pecuniary damages from the relation-
ship alone); Ferraro v. Augustine, 45 II. App. 2d 295, 196 N.E.2d 16 (1964) (a presumption
obtains in favor of pecuniary loss and substantial damages which operate in favor of
lineal kinsmen). Perhaps it was this treatment of the presumption that caused authors
Mirza and Appleman to state, incorrectly, that the presumption is not rebuttable. J.
MIRZA & J. APPLEMAN, ILLINOIs TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 446, 449 (1974).
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proof that no pecuniary loss was sustained.53 This creates diffi-
culty in determining the effect the presumption has on the
burden of proof because it is unclear what evidence will be suffi-
cient to overcome the presumption. 54 The rebuttable nature of
the presumption may therefore mean that parents' recovery for
53. In practice, the plaintiff may present evidence regarding the decedent's good
health, industrious nature, and potential longevity. The defendant may present contrary
evidence. The judge will give an instruction which merely states there is a presumption of
a substantial pecuniary loss. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 31.01 (2d ed.
1971). The jury must sort out the evidence and facts and render an award which repre-
sents the pecuniary injury suffered by the plaintiff.
In cases decided after Flynn, the Illinois courts have held that the jury is afforded great
latitude in determining an award after weighing the evidence with such other evidence
presented by the defendant in mitigation of the presumption. See Rusher v. Smith, 70 Ill.
App. 3d 889, 388 N.E.2d 906 (1979) (verdict of $39,000 for loss of a son was reversed as
bearing no relation to the pecuniary loss sustained by parents when testimony showed he
contributed little money to his parents, had not finished high school, and had problems
with the law); Yamanda v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 60 Ill. App. 3d 101, 376 N.E.2d 227 (1977)
(defendant's evidence in mitigation of damages that decedent had no dependants was not
sufficient to rebut the presumption); Prather v. Lockwood, 19 Ill. App. 3d 146, 310 N.E.2d
815 (1974) (award of $7,000 for 18 year old son upheld where evidence was presented as to
son's mental handicap); Morteson v. Sullivan, 3 Ill. App. 3d 332, 278 N.E.2d 6 (1972)
(presumption of loss arising from death of son was not rebutted by father's attempt to
terminate support payments for son).
54. The difficulty in determining the effect of the presumption was illustrated in the
appellate court's decision in Flynn v. Vancil, 89 Ill. App. 2d 368, 232 N.E.2d 473 (1967),
rev'd., 41 111. 2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237 (1968), in which two justices wrote special concur-
rences. While all three justices agreed that an award of zero damages for the wrongful
death of a two week old child could not stand, their reasons for reversing varied. Justice
Hoffman, writing the opinion for the court, held that while contrary or mitigating evi-
dence can lessen the loss that is otherwise presumed, in this case, the evidence that the
child had congenital defects was not sufficient. 89 Ill. App. 2d at 371, 232 N.E.2d at 475.
In a special concurrence, Justice Alloy characterized the presumption as durable, and
incapable of being wholly destroyed in the case of a young child. He based this observa-
tion on the fact that it is impossible to determine the contribution that a child might
make when the child dies at such a young age. Id. at 373, 232 N.E.2d at 475 (Alloy, J.,
concurring). Justice Strouder found wrongful death actions to be analogous to negligence
actions. Thus, the jury's finding the defendant negligent without finding an injury, an
essential element of negligence, was inherently contradictory. The justice stated that
there could be circumstances in which the presumption could be rebutted, but did not
examine what evidence would be sufficient to so rebut this presumption. Id. at 375, 232
N.E.2d at 477 (Strouder, J., concurring).
Another difficulty with the use of the presumption is the disparity in jury awards that
may result. In Trotter v. Moore, 113 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 447 N.E.2d 1340 (1983), the decedent
was a 16 year old girl who died as a result of injuries sustained in a car crash. Evidence
was introduced which established that the decedent assisted with her father's wholesale
food business and that it was anticipated she would operate the business at some future
time. The jury awarded $7,000 to the parents. In Baird v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R, 63 Ill. 2d
463, 349 N.E.2d 413 (1975), the decedent was a 17 year old high school student who
aspired to be a special education teacher. Evidence as to her intelligence, health, and
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the loss of a child could be minimal. 55 A child will rarely con-
tribute enough to a household to exceed the amount spent by the
parents in raising the child, and thus the presumption of loss
may be easily overcome.56
Expansion of the Term "Pecuniary Injury"
The second means of expanding the pecuniary loss limitation
has been the broad interpretation of the term "pecuniary injury"
to include certain non-financial injuries. The Illinois Supreme
Court examined the scope of pecuniary injury in Hall v. Gillins5 7
and Knierim v. Izzo. 5 8 Both cases were common law actions,
and in neither case did the plaintiff seek statutory recovery
under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act. The plaintiffs in Hall had
sought recovery for the loss of support, guidance, advice, and
affection of the decedent as husband and father.5 9 In Knierim,
the spouse claimed damages for loss of consortium. 60 The court
reasoned in both cases that the remedies sought were not signifi-
cantly different from the statutory remedy provided by the Wrong-
ful Death Act. In Hall, the court stated: "[T]he term pecuniary
injury has received an interpretation that is broad enough to
include most of the items of damage that are claimed by the
plaintiffs in this case."61 Similarly, in cases brought under the
excellent relationship with her parents was submitted at trial. The jury awarded $188,000
to the parents. On review, both verdicts were upheld. The court in Trotter recognized the
disparity in the amounts of awards granted in the wrongful death of young people. The
court cited its decision in Long v. Benett, 55 Ill. App. 3d 50, 370 N.E.2d 627 (1977), in
which an award of $5,000 compensatory damages for the death of a high school aged son
was held to be inadequate. The court in Trotter, however, concluded that the $7,000
awarded in this case was not insubstantial as a matter of law nor so nominal so as to be
inadequate. For further discussion of Trotter, see supra note 97.
55. Note, supra note 6, at 260. In practice, the presumption has not been easily over-
come. This practice has been criticized as abrogating the standard tort rule that proof of
damages are an inherent part of the plaintiffs case. See Recent Decisions, supra note 48,
at 686.
56. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
57. 13 Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958).
58. 22 lIl. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
59. In Hall, the widow and son of the deceased brought a common law action to avoid
the statutory limit of damages then in effect- under Wrongful Death Act. The wife had
requested damages of $142,450 and the son had requested $47,500. The maximum recov-
ery for all damages in 1957 under the Act was $30,000. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, 2 (1957).
60. In Knierim, the wife of the deceased sought recovery for the alleged murder of her
husband under the Wrongful Death Act and under a common law action for the loss of
consortium. The court found that a cause of action was stated under the Act but dis-
missed the common law complaint. 22 M1. 2d 26,147 N.E.2d 352 (1958).
61. Hall, 13 IIl. 2d at 31, 147 N.E.2d 355.
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Wrongful Death Act, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that
the jury may award damages for the decedent's felicity and care
as a father,6 2 and has allowed awards for the child's loss of
instruction and moral training due to the death of the father.63
The most explicit expansion of the term "pecuniary injury"
occurred only one year ago in Elliott v. Willis. 64 Paul Elliott was
killed when his car collided with a truck. At trial, evidence con-
cerning the companionable nature of the relationship between
the decedent and his wife was admitted, but the court did not
instruct the jury as to the use or effect of the evidence. 65 The
court refused to instruct the jury on the loss of consortium as an
element of damages, and the jury returned a verdict of $4,500.66
The plaintiff estate appealed, contending that the refusal to give
the proffered instructions was reversible error, and that the
judgment was too low as a matter of law.6 7 The appellate court
reversed, and held that the plaintiff estate should have been
permitted the instruction on lost consortium.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on the issue of loss of
consortium.68 In the majority opinion, Justice Clark formulated
the issue succinctly: Is a spouse's loss of consortium compensa-
62. In Allendorfv. Elgin, J. & E. R.I Co., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288 (1956), the wife
of the decedent brought an action on behalf of herself and her children under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 351 (1956), and under the Illinois Wrongful Death
Act. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld an award of $127,500 which was in excess of the
amount of future earnings presented as evidence by an actuarial who had testified at
trial. The court cited the reasoning of a California case, Miller v. Southern Pac. Co., 117
Cal. App. 2d 492, 156 P.2d 603 (1955), in which the California Supreme Court had upheld
an award in excess of the evidence. The court held that the excess represented an award
to the children for the loss of their father's care, attention, and guidance. Following this
reasoning, the court in Allendorf concluded that the jury may award damages for such
intangibles as the father's kind and faithful nature.
63. See Goddard v. Enzler, 222 111. 462, 78 N.E. 805 (1906); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Wel-
don, 52 Ill. 290 (1869).
64. 92 Ill. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163(1982).
65. Elliott v. Willis, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1144, 1145, 412 N.E.2d 638, 639(1980).
66. The instruction given to the jury was ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTION (CIVIL)
No. 31.07 (2d ed. 1971), which states, "[I]n determining 'pecuniary injuries' you may not
consider the following factors: 1. the pains and suffering of decedent; 2. the loss of dece-
dent's society by the widow; 3. the grief or sorrow of the widow." Id. (emphasis in
original).
67. A second issue raised on appeal concerned the estate's loss of accumulation
caused by the payment of estate taxes. The appellate court held that it was improper to
deny evidence of that loss. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and held that the trial
court acted properly in denying admission of evidence concerning inheritance and estate
taxes. 92 Ill. 2d at 530, 442 N.E.2d at 163.
68. 89 111. App. 3d 1144, 412 N.E.2d 638 (1980). The appellate court examined three
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ble as a pecuniary injury under the Wrongful Death Act?69 Con-
sortium was defined to include society, guidance, companion-
ship, felicity, and sexual relations,70 and was deemed unique to
the marriage partner.7' In answering the question affirmatively,
the court focused on prior interpretations of the term "pecuniary
injury," relying on Hall v. Gillins72 and Knierim v. Izzo7 3 to
define the many elements generally considered compensable
under the Wrongful Death Act.74 The court then examined cases
which had allowed recovery under the Wrongful Death Act for a
child's loss of a father's felicity and care and for the loss of
instruction and moral training.7 5 The court concluded that to be
consistent with this broad interpretation of pecuniary injury
under the Act, loss of consortium must be included. The court
reasoned that "since we have held that the felicity and care of a
father are capable of evaluation as 'pecuniary injuries' under the
cases to conclude that the jury instruction was not justified by the case law in the state.
The court looked at Knierim and Hall, two cases in which the Illinois Supreme Court
refused to acknowledge common law actions for the loss of consortium and destruction of
the family unit because similar remedies were available under the Wrongful Death Act.
See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. The court held that a wife could maintain
an action for the loss of consortium that resulted from the non-fatal injuries suffered by
her husband. The court concluded, "Thus Illinois case law permits either spouse to sue for
loss of consortium following non-fatal injuries to the other spouse and implies that for
death, the Wrongful Death Act provides compensation sufficient to obviate a common-
law action for lost society or consortium." 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1147, 412 N.E.2d at 641.
69. Id. at 534-35,442 N.E.2d at 165.
70. The court relied on the definition that had been formulated in Dini v. Niaditch, 20
Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960). In Dini, the court recognized a wife's action for loss of
consortium following non-fatal injuries, holding that consortium includes, "in addition to
material services, elements of companionship, felicity and sexual intercourse, all welded
into a conceptualistic unity." Id. at 427, 170 N.E.2d at 891.
71. In Mitchell v. White Motor Co., 58 Ill. 2d 159, 317 N.E.2d 505 (1974), the Illinois
Supreme Court set forth the rule for the statute of limitations in actions for the loss of
consortium following non-fatal injuries. In finding that the statute of limitations was five
years, the court characterized loss of consortium, not as an injury to the plaintiff's per-
son, but as an injury to a personal relationship established by the marriage contract.
Consortium is thus considered unique to the husband and wife as joined in a marriage
contract.
72. 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961). See supra notes 63, 65 and accompanying text.
73. 13 111. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958). See supra notes 62, 64 and accompanying text.
74. 92 IIl. 2d at 535-36, 442 N.E.2d at 166.
75. The court cited Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. R.R., 8 Ill. 2d 164,133 N.E.2d 288 (1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 853, reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 937 (1967). In Allendorf, the court had
construed pecuniary injury to allow the jury to award damages for such intangibles as
the decedent's felicity and care. The court also referred to Goddard v. Enzler, 222 Ill. 462,
78 N.E. 205 (1906), and Anthony Ittner Brick Co. v. Ashby, 198 Ill. 562, 64 N.E. 1109
(1902), as cases in which the court upheld awards for a child's loss of instruction and
training due to the death of their father.
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Wrongful Death Act, we are compelled to conclude that the com-
panionship and conjugal relationship of a spouse are equally
compensable as 'pecuniary injuries'. '76
Further support for the court's decision in Elliott was drawn
from the purpose of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act and from
the interpretation of the term "pecuniary injury" in other juris-
dictions. The purpose of the Act was characterized as providing
the surviving spouse the benefits that would have been received
from the continuing life of the decedent.77 Loss of consortium
was included as one of these benefits. The court recognized the
difficulty of calculating a precise value of consortium, but said
that "[t]he damages for loss of a husband's society, companion-
ship and sexual relations are not immeasurable. All of the ele-
ments that comprise what is to be loss of consortium may not be
the most tangible items, but a jury is capable of putting a mone-
tary worth on them.178
The court looked to other jurisdictions to acknowledge the
expansion of the term.79 The court quoted a Michigan Supreme
Court case that had analyzed the pecuniary value of a human
life in terms of the relationships shared within a family.80 The
value of the mutual society and protection that each family
member contributed was deemed to have a substantial pecuniary
value.81 Following this reasoning, the Elliott court concluded
76. Elliott, 92 Il1. 2d at 538, 442 N.E.2d at 167. The court examined an appellate court
decision, Kaiserman v. Bright, 61 111. App. 3d 67, 377 N.E.2d 261 (1978), in which, the
appellate court had affirmed the trial court's dismissal of one count of a parent's wrong-
ful death complaint that sought compensation for the loss of their child's society. The
court cited Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp., 23 Ill. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303 (1961),
as authority for excluding loss of society from the scope of pecuniary damages. The
supreme court in Elliott disagreed with this reasoning, finding that Zostautas denied
recovery for emotional distress, not for the loss of society. The Elliott court did not
expressly overrule Kaiserman, but it criticized the basis for the court's holding that the
loss of a child's society was not compensable under the Wrongful Death Act.
77. 92 Ill. 2d at 540, 442 N.E.2d at 168.
78. Id.
79. Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
80. Wyko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960). See supra notes 34-36.
81.
The pecuniary value of a human life is a compound of many elements.... [An
individual member of a family has a value to others as part of a functioning
social and economic unit. This value is the value of mutual society and protec-
tion, in a word, companionship. The human companionship thus afforded has a
definite, substantial and ascertainable pecuniary value and its loss forms a part
of the "value" of the life we seek to ascertain.
92 Ill. 2d at 540, 442 N.E.2d at 168 (citing Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. at 339-340, 105
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that the widow's loss of consortium is one compensable element
of the pecuniary value of the decedent's worth.
Thus, the court expanded the scope of the term "pecuniary
injury" to encompass another intangible element, the loss of a
spouse's consortium. The Illinois Appellate Court, however, has
not continued this expansion. Rather, subsequent appellate court
decisions have limited the scope by refusing to allow recovery for
a parent's loss of a child's society.82 One of these decisions,
Bullard v. Barnes, is currently on review before the Illinois
Supreme Court.83
DENIAL OF RECOVERY
FOR THE LOSS OF A CHILD'S SOCIETY:
Bullard v. Barnes
Scott Bullard, a seventeen year old high school student, suf-
fered fatal injuries as a result of a traffic collision.84 Scott's par-
ents filed a multi-count action against the defendants and includ-
ed counts under the Wrongful Death Act.8 5 The trial court, inter-
preting Elliott v. Willis, gave instructions to the jury to consider
the parents' loss of society resulting from the death of their child
in determining the amount of pecuniary loss.86 The jury returned
N.W.2d at 122-23).
82. See Bullard v. Barnes, 112 Il1. App. 3d 384,445 N.E.2d 485 (1983); Trotter v. Moore,
113 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 447 N.E.2d 1340 (1983). See infra note 97 and text accompanying
notes 84-96.
83. Bullard, 112 Ill. App. 3d 384, 445 N.E.2d 485 (1983), appeal docketed, No. 58-203
(Ill. Sup. Ct. May Term, 1983). Oral argument was heard by the court on November 30,
1983.
84. Bullard v. Barnes, 112111. App. 3d at 386, 445 N.E.2d at 488.
85. Counts were brought under the Wrongful Death Act, the Family Expense Act, ILL
REv. STAT. ch. 401,1 1015 (1979), and the Survival Act, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, 1 27-6
(1979). The plaintiffs also alleged property damage to the car. They were subsequently
allowed to amend their complaint to add counts which alleged general emotional agony
and suffering by the parents. At pretrial, the emotional agony and suffering counts were
dismissed. After voir dire had begun, defendants admitted liability for counts brought
under the Wrongful Death Act, the Family Expense Act, and the Survival Act, and for
the property damage. The trial court severed the punitive property damage count from
the compensatory claims brought under the Survival and Wrongful Death Acts and
ordered that a bifurcated trial be held.
86. The instructions given were adopted from the ILLINoIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUC
TIONS (CIVIL) No. 31.03 (2d ed. 1971).
In determining pecuniary loss to the parents and the weight to be given to the
presumption of pecuniary loss to the parents, you may consider what benefits of
pecuniary value, including money, goods and services the decedent might rea-
sonably have been expected to contribute to his parents and brothers had the
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a general verdict for wrongful death in the amount of $285,000.87
Cross-appeals followed after judgment was entered on the verdict
and post-trial motions were denied.80 The appellate court re-
versed on the issue of the propriety of the jury instructions and
remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages.8 9
The appellate court examined the language and rationale of
the decision in Elliott v. Willis and reached the conclusion that
the trial court had erred in giving the modified jury instructions
that included loss of society as an element of compensable
damages.90 The court found no express language in either the
appellate or supreme court decisions in Elliott that would allow
the loss of society of a child to be considered.9 1 Elliott was not
extended to this factual setting because the court determined
that there was a qualitative difference between the society of a
spouse and that of the child. The court did not elaborate as to the
difference, stating only that society is inherent in the marital
relationship.92
The court held that an action brought under the Wrongful
Death Act is analogous to an action brought at common law for
non-fatal injuries. The Wrongful Death Act was designed to pro-
vide the same compensation for fatal injuries as are available for
non-fatal injuries.93 The court in Bullard concluded that since
there was no common law action for the loss of society of an
decedent lived, bearing in mind what you find the evidence shows concerning
the decedent's age, sex, health, physical and mental characteristics, habits and
the parent's loss of society with the decedent.
Bullard, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 389, 445 N.E.2d at 489 (emphasis added to indicate that por-
tion of the instruction added by the court to the pattern instruction).
87. The jury also returned a general verdict of $40,000 for the decedent's pain and
suffering under the Survivor's Act.
88. The defendant argued for post-trial motions for a new trial and a judgment n.o.v.,
claiming that improper and repetitive jury instructions had been given.
89. 112 Ill. App. 3d at 389, 445 N.E.2d at 489. The plaintiffs cross-appealed the dismis-
sal of the counts alleging general emotional agony and suffering by the parents. Defend-
ants appealed various issues concerning inconsistent and repetitive language in the
instructions and improper evidentiary admissions.
90. Id. at 390, 445 N.E.2d at 490.
91. The court found that although the supreme court in Elliott had criticized Kaiser-
man v. Bright, 61 Ill. App. 3d 67, 377 N.E.2d 261 (1978), which denied recovery for par-
ents' loss of their child's society, the case had not been overruled. See supra note 76.
92. 112 Ill. App. 3d at 390, 445 N.E.2d at 490.
93. The court drew the analogy from the reasoning of the appellate court's decision in
Elliott. See supra note 68. The Bullard court stated, "[11f, as the appellate court opinion in
Elliott implies, the Wrongful Death Act is to supply the gap for fatal injuries and is the
obverse of common law nonfatal actions, there is no basis for including within its dam-
age provisions the loss of society of a child." Id. at 390, 445 N.E.2d at 490.
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injured child, there was no reason to allow recovery for the loss
of a child's society under the Wrongful Death Act.9 4
Although the Bullard court acknowledged that the Illinois
Supreme Court favored a broad interpretation of the term
"pecuniary injury,"95 the appellate court was not willing to extend
the interpretation to a parent's loss of society. Bullard did not
address the purpose of the Wrongful Death Act and did not
address the overall trend of the courts toward recognizing intan-
gible elements of family relations, as did the Illinois Supreme
Court in Elliott.96 Rather, the court adopted a narrow interpre-
tation of Elliott, holding that it applied only to the loss of consor-
tium in the spousal relationship. 97
Bullard on Review
To clarify the issue of damages awarded for the loss of a
child's society, the Illinois Supreme Court must provide new
guidance beyond the holding in Elliott. In making this analysis,
the court should further define the scope of the term "pecuniary
injury." The court must analyze the trend of recent decisions and
the purpose of the Wrongful Death Act to determine the manner
in which to compensate parents for the loss of a child.
The severity of the traditional pecuniary loss limitation, which
is incorporated into the Illinois Act, is most apparent when
imposed on a parent's action for the wrongful death of a child.
Historically, children may have provided a significant economic
contribution to their families,98 but social and economic changes
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
97. 112 Ill. App. 3d at 390, 445 N.E.2d at 490. An appellate court decision subsequent
to the Bullard decision also denied recovery for the loss of a child's society. See Trotter v.
Moore, 113 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 447 N.E.2d 1340 (1983). Although the Trotter holding follows
that of Bullard, there are important distinctions in the court's reasoning. The Trotter
court considered the Elliott decision carefully in formulating its decision. While the court
in Trotter agreed that Elliott confined its holding to the spouse's fatal loss of consortium,
it did not find that there was a qualitative difference between the loss of society and the
loss of consortium, as had the court in Bullard. Instead, the Trotter court stated that it
found no qualitative difference between the elements of the relationship that exists
between children and their next of kin and between spouses. The Trotter court, however,
was pursuaded by the reasoning that since there is no recovery for the loss of a child's
society in non-fatal actions, there should be no recovery under the Wrongful Death Act.
98. Wrongful Death of a Child, supra note 6, at 542. Employment of children of eight
years or older was common in the 19th century and children were wage earners in a real
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have rendered the child's contribution negligible. 99 Furthermore,
the expense in raising and supporting a child has become propor-
tionately greater.100 As a result, it is very difficult to prove a sig-
nificant economic loss upon the wrongful death of a child. 10' This
requirement, that a parent must prove an economic injury to
receive compensation, has been criticized as being inconsistent
with the purposes and policies that underlie a wrongful death
statute.10
2
WRONGFUL DEATH COMPENSATION:
Policy Considerations
The language in the Illinois Act conveys its remedial purpose
clearly: 0 3 "[T]he jury may give such damages as they deem a
fair and just compensation .... "104 The courts' concern with
providing fair and just compensation is evidenced by the ever
expanding interpretation of the limit of pecuniary loss. 105 The
sense. Thus, it was possible to prove that a child contributed financial benefits to his
parents.
99. Today the child is no longer a wage earner in any significant capacity. Manda-
tory school attendance laws and almost universal child-labor laws keep children out of
the labor market. For a discussion of the evolution of these social changes see generally
Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
100. See Wrongful Death of a Child, supra note 6, at 537.
101. The most common element of damages awarded for the death of a minor is the
amount the child would have earned and would presumably have contributed to the
household or to his upbringing until he reached his majority. In addition, most states
allow damages for the amount contributed by the child to his parents after reaching his
majority. Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 506-09 (1950). Although the post-majority approach
provides a broader basis for an award, the problem of proving that the child would have
conferred financial benefits upon the parents is a significant one. See, e.g., Decof, supra
note 19, at 199. Illinois courts allow recovery for the child's financial contribution until
the child reaches the age of 21 after deducting the cost of his maintenance for the same
period. Furthermore, the parents may recover the amount of money they could reason-
ably have expected the child to have contributed after the child reached 21. U.S. Brewing
Co. v. Stoltenberg, 211 fl1. 531, 71 N.E. 1081 (1908).
102. "That this barbarous concept of the pecuniary loss to a parent from the death of
a child should still control our decisions today is a reproach to justice." Wycko v.
Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 333, 105 N.W. 2d at 120.
103. J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 54.05 (4th ed. 1975).
Justice Cardozo, in construing the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, stated: "Death statutes
have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms of the law.... It would be a misfor-
tune if a narrow or guiding process of construction were to exemplify and perpetuate the
very evils to be remedied." Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1937).
104. Lu. REV. STAT., ch. 70, 2 (1981).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 62-93.
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legislature's concern is also apparent in that the statutory limit
for recovery was increased five times until it was finally
abandoned. 106
The public policy that prompts courts and legislatures to
assure fair and just compensation should be studied in con-
junction with the recognized value of the family unit, which
inherently includes the parent-child relationship. It is the specific
policy of promoting, fostering, and preserving the family that
mandates the recognition of the totality of the parent's loss.
The judiciary across the nation has expressly recognized the
value of the family unit.10 7 In allowing a common law maritime
action for the loss of consortium, the United States Supreme
Court specifically considered the word "society" as it relates to
the family unit.108 The Court recognized that family members
receive a broad range of mutual benefits from each other. These
benefits include love, affection, companionship, comfort, and
protection. 10 9 In allowing recovery for the death of a family
member, the Court recognized the value of family relationships
and the substantial injury that results from the destruction of
these relations. 110
The recognition of the value of the family unit is apparent in
Illinois as well. The Illinois legislature recites the policy of pro-
moting and preserving the family to guide the implementation of
statutes that impact the family structure."' The Illinois courts
106. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 70, 1 historical note 530 (Smith-Hurd 1975).
107. See, e.g., Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W. 2d 118 (1960) (an individual
family member has a value as part of a functioning social and economic unit); Fusner v.
Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W. 2d 355 (1962) (the benefits of a family relationship are
not solely economical; the Wrongful Death Act should be liberally construed to compen-
sate for the full extent of a parent's loss of a child); Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d
210 (1980) (family relationships encompass more than the exchange of physical chores;
companionship, advice, and guidance are also elements of family relationships); Sanchez
v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983) (injuries to the familial relationship are signifi-
cant injuries and are worthy of compensation).
108. Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974). See supra notes 37-39 and accom-
panying text.
109. Sea-Land, 414 U.S. at 585.
110. After identifying the mutual benefits that each family member receives from the
other, the Court continued, "[Tihe deprivation of these benefits by wrongful death is a
grave loss to the decedent's dependents." Id. at 585-86.
111. The Illinois legislature articulated one purpose of the Illinois Marriage & Disso-
lution of Marriage Act ("IMDMA") as to "strengthen and preserve the integrity of mar-
riage and safeguard family relationships." Illinois Marriage & Dissolution of Marriage
Act, § 102-2, ILL REV. STAT. ch.40, 102(2) (1981). A stated purpose of the Juvenile Court
Act is to "preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties." Illinois Juvenile Court Act,
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have turned to this policy when faced with difficult issues involv-
ing family relationships.' 12
The same policy considerations that compel identification of
the value of the family unit support the recognition of true and
just compensation for the loss of a child. An award for the loss of
a child's society and companionship comes closer than an award
for the child's economic contribution to compensating parents
for their true loss.
The Illinois courts have not yet followed the trend of other
jurisdictions in recognizing, to the same extent, the parents'
injury for the loss of a child." 3 The courts have recognized, how-
ever, that the loss suffered in the destruction of other family
relationships extends beyond pure economic loss. 11 4 In a child's
action for the loss of a parent, the term "pecuniary injury"
includes the loss of the decedent's felicity and care, instruction,
and moral training." 5 In a spouse's action, the term includes the
loss of consortium." 6 The reasoning that has led the Illinois
courts to hold that these intangible elements of family relation-
ships are pecuniary injuries should lead to the conclusion that
the loss of society between a parent and child is also a pecuniary
§ 1-2, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37, 701-2(1) (1981).
112. For example, courts have recited the purpose clause of the IMDMA in difficult
settlement cases. E.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979) (judicial
recognition of mutual property rights would violate the policy of the IMDMA); In re Mar-
riage of Gunther (marriage to a bigamist following divorce contravenes legislature's
desire to safeguard family relations).
In Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983), the Illinois Supreme
Court considered the issue of damages in wrongful birth actions. The court limited the
recovery to the expenses that resulted from the pregnancy and the birth, rejecting the
plaintiffs claim for damages including the cost of raising the child. In examining the
policies that necessitated the limited award the court stated: "[I]t is clear that public
policy commands the development and the preservation of family relations." Id. at 201,
447 NE.2d at 390.
113. S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at 308; Note, supra note 6, at 257. See also Sea-Land
Servs. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1973) (spouse may recover for loss of her husbands's
society under a maritime wrongful death action); Fusner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113
N.W.2d 355 (1962) (father may recover for the pecuniary value of his daughter's advice,
comfort, assistance, and protection); Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980) (jury
may award damages for parents' loss of their child's companionship as they grow older
as well as the advice and guidance that often accompanies it); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651
S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983) (parents may recover damages for the loss of companionship and
society and damages for mental anguish for the death of their child).
114. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 62-63.
116. See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text
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injury. The Illinois Supreme Court has determined that the pur-
pose of the Wrongful Death Act is to provide to the decedent's
family the benefits that would have been received from the con-
tinued life of the decedent.1 17 A child's loss of society is a benefit
that the parents would have enjoyed had the child lived. The loss
of consortium, felicity, care, instruction, and moral training
result from the injury to the relationship that occurs upon death.
The loss of society is a similar injury and should be compensated
in a similar manner.118
The argument asserted by the appellate court that the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act can serve only to compensate for the same
injuries which are compensable in a common law action for non-
fatal injuries 1 9 reflects neither the purpose of the Wrongful
117. Elliott v. Willis, 92 Ill. 2d at 540, 442 N.E.2d at 168. In Elliott, the court was only
concerned with the spouse's benefits that were lost upon the death of the other spouse. In
this decision, however, the court did not limit its analysis to cases involving the spouse's
loss of consortium. The court discussed cases involving a child's action, Goddard v.
Enzler, 222 Ill. 462, 78 N.E. 805 (1968), as well as cases involving a parent's action for the
loss of a child's society, Kaiserman v. Bright, 61 Ill. App. 3d 67, 377 N.E.2d 261 (1978);
Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331,105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
118. The Nebraska statute provides that the jury shall give a judgment for the
amount of. damages suffered. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-810 (1972). There is no explicit limita-
tion of pecuniary damages, but the Nebraska Supreme Court had construed the statute to
limit damages to the pecuniary loss, although it allowed recovery for the loss of the
society, comfort, and companionship of a spouse in Ensor v. Compton, 110 Neb. 522, 104
N.W. 458 (1918). Subsequently, in Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 2d 275, 207 N.W.2d 686
(1973), the question of whether a parent could recover for the loss of a child's society was
presented to the court. In allowing the parents' recovery, the court said, "[Tihere is no
logical reason for treating an injury to the family relationship resulting from the wrong-
ful death of a child more restrictively." Id. at 279, 207 N.W.2d at 689.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has suggested that there is an inconsistency between
the recovery allowed to a child when a parent dies and the recovery allowed in a parent's
action. The child may recover for care and training, yet the parent cannot recover for the
child's society, which includes this same care. The court remedied the double standard by
finding that the loss of a child's society is a compensable injury. Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J.
1, 8, 424 A.2d 210, 213, (1980).
119. This was the rationale of the court in Bullard and in Trotter in denying a par-
ent's recovery for the loss of the child's society. Both courts relied on the language of the
appellate court decision in Elliott v. Willis, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1144, 412 N.E.2d 638 (1980),
aff'd, 92 Ill. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982). The language in Elliott states, "[T]hus, Illinois
case law permits either spouse to sue for the loss of consortium following nonfatal injur-
ies to the other spouse and implies that for death, the Wrongful Death Act provides com-
pensation sufficient to obviate a common law action for lost society or consortium." Elli-
ott, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1144, 412 N.E.2d at 641. See supra note 68: This language was cited
in Bullard, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 390, 445 N.E.2d at 490. This reasoning was not reiterated by
the supreme court when it affirmed Elliott. Furthermore, this reasoning was not the basis
for allowing a child to recover for the loss of a father's felicity and care. E.g., Goddard v.
Enzler, 222 111. 462, 78 N.E. 803 (1906). Therefore, while the appellate court in Elliott may
have reasoned that it was logical to allow compensation for the loss of a spouse's consor-
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Death Act nor the trend of courts in other jurisdictions in focus-
ing on the nature and definition of pecuniary injuries. The
supreme court's attention to the nature of the injury when
assessing the pecuniary value 120 and the recognized value of the
family unit 121 indicates that the loss of society could be recog-
nized as a pecuniary injury and thus compensated for under the
Wrongful Death Act.
The impact on future litigation of recognizing the loss of
society as a pecuniary damage will be significant for several rea-
sons. The court will have a consistent interpretation of the term
pecuniary injury. This will allow trial courts to direct the jury to
compensate for recognized elements of damages in future wrong-
ful death actions.1 22 Confusion as to which damages are recov-
erable when other family relations are destroyed may result if
the court retreats from expanding the scope of pecuniary injury.1 23
Allowing the jury to consider the loss of society as an element
of damages will enable the trial and reviewing courts to insure
that the proper elements of the injury are being considered. The
tium after death because it was allowed after nonfatal injuries, it is not clear that the
supreme court intended to limit recovery under the Wrongful Death Act to the damages
that are available in a nonfatal injury action. See also Note, A Minor Child's Claim for
Lost Parental Society and Companionship in Illinois: Another Look, 17 J. MAR. L.R. 113,
117 n.19 (1984).
120. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
122. The supreme court held in Elliott that the jury may be instructed as to a spouse's
loss of consortium in wrongful death cases not finally adjudicated as of the date of this
decision. 92 111. 2d at 545, 442 N.E.2d at 170.
123. The question that may arise next is whether collateral kin, such as a brother or
sister, will be able to recover for the loss of their sibling's society. It has been argued that
by allowing a parent to recover for the loss of society, the door will be open to allow the
same recovery by all next of kin. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 56, Bullard v. Barnes,
No. 58-203 (Ill. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 30, 1983). This, however, is not necessarily true. The
Illinois courts have distinguished between the damages compensable to a parent, child,
or spouse and those compensable to collateral kin. The presumption of pecuniary loss
that is held to apply in all cases involving lineal heirs, see supra notes 52, 55, and accom-
panying text, has not been applied in cases involving collateral kin. See Howlett v.
Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949). In Mugaviro v. Chicago B. & Q. RR., 239 Ill.
App. 544 (1926), the court held that there is no presumption that the brothers and sisters
of a deceased minor suffered more than nominal damages by his death. Thus, the
supreme court might have some precedent for limiting the award of damages to a brother
or sister. In other jurisdictions, it appears that fewer courts allow recover for the loss of
a sibling's society than allow for the loss of a child's society. See S. SPEISER, supra note 7,
at 316 n.95. This distinction may not be warranted, however, because the Wrongful Death
Act itself makes no distinction between the damages to be awarded for the loss of a
parent, a spouse, or a brother. The Act provides compensation for pecuniary injuries to
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jury can be instructed to consider the economic contribution the
child would have provided and the value of the companionship
as established by the evidence. 124 The jury can also be instructed
not to compensate for the grief and bereavement suffered by the
parents, which has been held to be uncompensable in Illinois. 125
This, in turn, will allow the trial and reviewing courts to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the award. An evidentiary record is
essential to enable the appellate court to decide whether the
damages are excessive, nominal, or reasonable. 126 The disparity
among jury awards thus may be eased by the appellate courts'
increased ability to review the award of damages. 127
In addition, by allowing recovery for the loss of a child's
society, the true elements of a parent's loss will be recognized.
Although it is true that the emotional pain suffered as the result
of a child's death is a substantial injury, 128 the parents will also
suffer greatly from the loss of the child's company. 129 Recog-
nizing this directly by allowing compensation for the loss of
the spouse and next of kin. If the term "pecuniary injury" is defined to include loss of a
child's society, it would be consistent to include the loss of a sibling's society. Just as
there is no qualitative difference between the society of a spouse and that of a child,
Trotter, 113 111. App. 3d at 1015, 447 N.E.2d at 1344, there is no qualitative difference
between the society of a child and that of a sibling. See supra note 97.
124. See S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at 322, and Pavalon, Damages- Wrongful Death of
Children, 50 CHI. B. REC. 84 (1968), for discussion of the circumstances that establish
evidence of a loss of society in a wrongful death action.
125. Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp., 23 Il. 2d 326, 178 N.E. 2d 303 (1961);
Robertson v. White, 11 ll. App. 2d 177, 136 N.E.2d 550 (1956).
126. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 123 for a discussion of the disparity in jury awards. The reviewing
courts have noted the difficulty in reviewing jury awards. For example, in Jones v. Kar-
reker, 109 1ll. App. 3d 363, 440 N.E.2d 420 (1982), the plaintiff brought a medical malprac-
tice action to recover for the wrongful death of an unborn fetus. The jury found the
defendant liable and awarded $125,000 in damages. The appellate court noted that since
there could be no supporting evidence as to the child's health or life expectancy, the
award was based almost entirely on the presumption of pecuniary loss. In assessing the
role of the reviewing court, the court stated: "[W]here there is a reversal by a reviewing
court, it is often not based on [a] specific evidentiary basis but upon a conclusion, within
its discretion, that the award was simply too high or too low." Id. at 367, 440 N.E. at 422.
128. See Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651
S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983). See also Note, supra note 6. For a historical perspective of allow-
ing compensation for grief under wrongful death statutes, see Strong, Such Damages Are
Just: A Proposal for More Realistic Compensation in Wrongful Death Cases, 43 MoNT. L.
REv. 55 (1982).
129. Pavalon, supra note 124, at 84. The author states, "[O1ur Illinois courts have not
as yet allowed compensation for the greatest loss of all suffered by the surviving parents,
the loss of the society and companionship of the child." Id.
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society instead of allowing recovery through the use of a pre-
sumption 130 is a forthright means of assuring that parents are
compensated for their losses.
Calculating Damages
Once pecuniary injury is defined to include loss of society,
there remains the problem of calculating the amount of the loss.
Mere difficulty in assessing the amount of damages, however, is
not a sufficient reason for denying the remedy.1 31 One method of
determining the amount of loss was adopted by the Connecticut
Supreme Court in Green v. Bittner.132 The court held that the
jury should be instructed to assess damages in consideration of
the cost of hiring an actual companion and the cost of obtaining
guidance, advice, and counsel. 33 This method limits the recovery
to the actual dollar value of employing a companion that may
provide the daily care to an aged parent that the child would
have provided.134 It is not necessary under this method to prove
that the parent would purchase such services; it is sufficient to
show that the child would have provided them. 135 The loss of
guidance, advice, and counsel are also compensable upon proof
130. It has been argued that the operation of the presumption adequately compen-
sates the plaintiffs and that there is therefore no reason to expand the scope of the term
pecuniary damage. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 58, Bullard v. Barnes, No. 58-203 (Ill.
Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 30, 1983). This argument fails to recognize, however, that the purpose
of the Wrongful Death Act is to compensate for actual injury. See ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70,
2 (1981). See also City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349 (1857).
131. See Elliott v. Willis, 92 Ill. 2d 330, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982).
132. 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980). The parents brought a wrongful death action after
their daughter, a high school senior, was killed in an automobile accident. The language
of the New Jersey statute limits recovery to pecuniary injuries. The jury apparently found
that the parents had sustained no pecuniary loss since they awarded no damages. The
New Jersey Supreme Court found that the verdict was a miscarriage of justice and
remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages. For a discussion of the case,
see Recent Developments, Under New Jersey's Wrongful Death Act, An Award of the
Pecuniary Value of the Parent's Loss of Their Child's Companionship, Advice and Guid-
ance is Appropriate, 27 ViLL. L. REV. 224 (1980-81).
133. The court held that, in addition to the loss of the value of the child's anticipated
help with the household chores, or the loss of anticipated direct financial contributions,
the jury may award damages for the "loss of their child's companionship as they grow
older, when it may be most needed and valuable, as well as the advice and guidance that
often accompanies it." 85 N.J. at 3,424 A.2d at 211.
134. The value of the child's companionship is the fair market value of comparable
companionship purchased from a stranger. The court added that no compensation can be
allowed for the emotional satisfaction that would have been derived from the child's
performance of the services as opposed to that of a stranger. Id. at 12, 424 A.2d at 215-16.
135. Id. at 18, 424 A.2d at 218.
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of the cost of obtaining the services from a qualified person.13 6
In Illinois, the courts have not required a monetary definition
of the instruction and training provided by the parent.137 Thus,
it is probable that if Illinois recognized loss of society as pecuni-
ary injury, the courts could follow the same procedures used
when calculating the loss of consortium between spouses. 138 By
instructing the jury that loss of society is an element of damages 139
and allowing them to weigh the evidence as to the nature of the
relationship in assessing the award, the award for loss of society
would not be automatic. Evidence would have to be presented,
not only to establish what economic contribution the child might
have rendered, but also to establish the extent of the compan-
ionship and society that existed in the parent-child relationship.1 40
The loss would be analyzed in light of the facts of each case.
CONCLUSION
Wrongful death acts were necessary to overcome the common
law prohibition against civil suits for a wrongful death of a fam-
ily member. The Illinois statute limits recovery to pecuniary
injuries suffered as a result of the death. The phrase "pecuniary
injuries" has been judicially construed to include both tangible
elements, such as the monetary value of support and services,
and intangible elements, such as consortium. The Illinois Su-
136. The court stated that the advice, guidance, or counsel that is compensable under
the Wrongful Death Act is the kind that "could be purchased from a business advisor, a
therapist, or a trained counselor." Id. at 14, 424 A.2d at 216-17.
137. The courts allow the jury to determine the value of the instruction and moral
training provided by the father prior to this death. Goddard v. Enzler, 22 IlM. 462, 78 N.E.
805(1906).
138. Elliott, 92 Ill. 2d at 540, 442 N.E.2d at 168. The Court held that ILLINOIS PATrERN
JURY INSTRUCTION (CIVIL) No. 31.01 (2d ed. 1971), which reads, "In determining 'pecu-
niary injuries' you may not consider.., the loss of the decedent's society to the next of
kin," is no longer valid in a spouse's action. To determine the pecuniary value of a
spouse, the society, companionship and conjugal relationship that constitute the loss of
consortium, may now be considered by the jury.
139. The ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTION (CIVIL) No. 31.01 (2d ed. 1971), now
directs the jury to consider "benefits of pecuniary value including money, goods and ser-
vices, the decedent might have contributed to his parent." Society could be added as
another benefit to be considered by the jury in determining the pecuniary value of the
decedent child. See supra note 86 for the jury instructions given by the trial court in
Bullard.
140. In assessing damages for loss of consortium, evidence of the nature of the
spousal relationship may be submitted. See Elliott, 92 11. 2d at 541,442 N.E.2d at 168.
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preme Court's case by case approach to defining the scope of
pecuniary injury has not established whether the loss of a child's
society is compensable under the Act.141
141. As this note was going to press, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a decision in
Bullard v. Barnes, No. 58203 (Ill. Sup. Ct. June 29, 1984). In a unanimous decision, author-
ed by Justice Underwood with a special concurrence by Justice Clark, the court concluded
that the term "pecuniary injury" does encompass the loss of a child's society in a wrong-
ful death action. The court determined,however, that while the jury will be
instructed to calculate the dollar amount of such a loss, they must likewise calculate the
amount of future expenses a parent would incur in raising the child. The amount of loss
must be offset by the amount of expenses; the remainder will be the amount awarded as
damages.
The court considered the statutory reference to pecuniary injuries and examined how
the pecuniary limitation had been interpreted in other jurisdictions. Of twenty-three
jurisdictions with a statutory or judicially imposed limitation, the court stated that four-
teen allow parental recovery for the loss of a child's society in a wrongful death action.
Id. at4.
The trend in Illinois law to expand the scope of pecuniary injury to encompass non-
monetary losses was noted by the court as it reviewed its decisions which illustrate this
expansion. The court cited Elliott v. Willis, 92 Ill. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982) as the
most recent example of the broadening definition of pecuniary injury and noted that
there it relied on Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958) and Knierim v. Izzo,
22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961). See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text. In
reviewing its decision in Elliott, the court noted its criticism of Kaiserman v. Bright, 61
Ill. App. 3d, 377 N.E.2d 261 (1978) in which the court erroneously based its decision to
dismiss a count for the loss of society in a wrongful death action on a case which denied
recovery for mental suffering. See supra note 76. The Bullard court reiterated the distinc-
tion between recovery for mental anguish and recovery for the loss of society and
emphasized that damages for mental anguish as an element of loss of society cannot be
awarded under the Wrongful Death Act. Bullard v. Baines, No. 58203, slip op. at 5. The
defendant's argument that the court await legislative action before judicially expanding
the scope of pecuniary injury was disregarded as the court found "in view of our earlier
decisions indicating similar recoveries would have been allowed in cases involving loss of
a parent (Hall) and spouse (Elliott, Knierim), that it would be anomalous to now deny
parents this form of recovery." Id. at 6.
The court then turned to a closely related issue, the presumption of pecuniary loss as it
is applied in actions to recover for the wrongful death of children. See supra notes 44-56
and accompanying text. The origin of the presumption was attributed to Lord Campbell's
Act and the subsequent British cases which established the narrow rule that parents
could only recover for actual loss of a child's income. See supra notes 18-25 and accom-
panying text. The incorporation of this rule into the Illinois Wrongful Death Act enacted
in 1853, was reflective of the economic and social conditions of the time. Bullard v.
Barnes, No. 58203, slip op. at 6. To balance the harshness of the limitation, the presump-
tion was developed beginning with the cases, City of Chicago v. Major, 18 IRl. 349 (1857)
and City of Chicago v. Scholten, 75 11. 468 (1874). See supra notes 45-47 and accompany-
ing text. The court noted, however, that the judicially created rule that parents are
entitled to a presumption that they have incurred a pecuniary loss upon the death of a
child bears little resemblance to the realities of modern family life. Bullard v. Barnes, No.
58203, flip op. at 6. The court therefore concluded that there can be no presumption for
loss of earning upon the death of a child. If the parents can present evidence that there
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In deciding this issue, the court must consider the history of
the Wrongful Death Act and the policies that underlie its inter-
pretation. If the court follows its trend of expanding the term
"pecuniary injury," it may find society to be included within that
term. Such a decision would reflect the public policy of preserving
and strengthening family relations and would reflect the purpose
of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act.
ANNE E. SEMAN
truly was a loss of earnings suffered upon a death of a child, they may recover the proven
amount.
The presumption was not entirely abandoned however as the court held that parents
are entitled to a presumption of pecuniary injury in the loss of a child's society. Defen-
dants may rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the parent and child did not
enjoy a close relationship. Id. at 7.
Although the court relied on wrongful death cases involving the loss of a parent or
spouse to find that the loss of society is within the pecuniary injury requirement, the
court made a careful distinction between the loss of a child and the loss of parents and
spouses stating, "[als a general rule, neither children nor spouses bear the same heavy
financial responsibility for either their parents or spouse that a parent automatically
assumes upon the birth of a child." Id. at 8. The court therefore concluded, as held in five
other jurisdictions, that jurors must consider child rearing expenses in arriving at a ver-
dict. Specifically, jurors must be instructed to assign a dollar value to the loss of the
child's socity and to arrive at a figure which represents expenditures the parents would
have been likely to incur had the child lived. These expenses must be deducted from any
awrad for the loss of society and proved loss of income. Id.
The court remanded the case for a new trial as to damages and limited the scope of the
decision to minor children. The court specifically did not decide whether the loss of
society presumption applies to children who have reached the age of majority. Id. at 7.
Justice Clark took issue with two points of the majority opinion although he concurred
in the result. First, Justice Clark found that since the set-off for childrearing expenses
could substantially reduce an award for the loss of society, the formula developed by the
majority to compute damages was not equitable. Second, the Justice disagreed with limit-
ing the decisions to minor children since the logic of the majority opinion would dictate
the same result in the case of children who had reached the age of majority. Id. at 11.
